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INSTANCES OF INDEPENDENT PRESIDENTIAL
TREATY TERMINATION
Jonathan York Thomas*
It is not proposed that the United
States denounce the convention...,
nor that it be otherwise abrogated.
Consequently, action by the Senate
or by the Congress is not required...,
It is merely a question of a declara-
tion of the inoperativeness of a
treaty which is no longer binding
because the conditions essential to
its continued effectiveness no longer
pertain.
--Acting Attorney General Biddle,
July 5, 1930, 5 G. Hackworth
Digest of International Law, 338-39
(1943)
Introduction
The Carter-Hua Communique of December 15, 1978,1 an-
nounced the intent of the United States to establish full
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China
(PRC), effective January 1, 1979. Though in no way
mandated to do so by the terms of this act of recogni-
tion, President Carter, at the insistence of the PRC,
followed on the Communique by giving notice to the
Republic of China2 (ROC or Taiwan) that the United
States was terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty of
*B.A. 1976, Yale University; D. Phil. Candidate, Oxford Uni-
versity; J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School.
1. Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Rela-
tions Between the United States of America and the People's Repub-
lic of China - January 1, 1979, 14 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 2264
(Dec. 18, 1978).
2. Id. at 2274.
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1954 between the United States and the ROC. 3 No
senatorial or congressional authorization was sought
prior to the termination announcement.
On December 22, 1978, Senator Barry Goldwater chal
lenged th, President on aspects of the termination issue
in a suit filed in the District Court for the District
of Columbia.5 Goldwater agreed that the so-called "for-
eign affairs clause" of the Constitution6 gave the
President competence to communicate the United States
stance on the fate of the Mutual Defense Treaty to the
Taiwan Government. But, he argued, no constitutional
reading vindicated the independent presidential formula-
tion of that stance: Carter should have solicited the
advice and consent of either two-thirds of the Senate
or a majority of both houses of Congress before decidin
to abrogate the Treaty.
The State Department has offered a number of argu-
ments in defense of Carter's actions. One such argument
revolves around the examination of past precedents as a
means of defining the proper procedure in a situation
similar to that at issue in the present case. Herbert
J. Hansell, the State Department's Legal Adviser, has
performed that examination and uncovered twelve past
3. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S. T. 433,
T.I.A.S. No. 3178, 248 U.N.T.S. 213. Article X of said treaty
states, "This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either
party may terminate at one year after notice has been given to the'
other party."
4. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979);
rev'd. per curiam, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); vacated as
nonjusticiabZle 100 S.Ct. 533 (1979) (mem.). Five Senators, one
senator-elect, and nine Congressmen are named as co-plaintiffs
along with Senator Goldwater. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance is
named as co-defendant.
5. For a thorough analysis of all aspects of the treaty
termination question, see D. Scheffer, "Comments: The Law of Treaty
Termination as Applied to the United States De-Recognition of the
Republic of China," 19 Harv. Int. L.J. 931-1009 (Fall, 1978).
6. The President's so-called "foreign affairs" powers are
enumerated in art. II § 2 of the Constitution.
7. "President's Power to give Notice of Termination of US-
ROC Mutual Defense Treaty," memorandum from Herbert J. Hansell,
State Department Legal Adviser, to the Secretary of State, December
15, 1978, reprinted in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong. 2d Sess., Termination of Treaties: The Constitutional
Allocation of Power (Comm. Print 1978).
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instances allegedly involving a President terminating a
treaty solely on his own initiative. These instances,
he argues, identify the Carter procedure as the proper
one. They are as follows:
In 1815, President Madison exchanged
correspondence with the Netherlands,
which has been construed recently by
the State Department as establishing
that the 1782 Treaty of Amity and Com-
merce between the two countries had been
annulled.
In 1899, President McKinley gave notice
to the Swiss Government of the United
States' intent "to arrest the operations"
of certain articles of the 1850 Convention
of Friendship, Commerce, and Extradition
with Switzerland.
In 1920, President Wilson, by agreement,
terminated the 1891 Treaty of Amity,
Commerce, and Navigation with Belgium
concerning the Congo.
In 1927, President Coolidge gave
notice of termination of the 1925 Treaty
with Mexico on the Prevention of Smuggling.
In 1933, President Roosevelt delivered
to the League of Nations a declaration of
the United States' withdrawal from the 1927
multilateral Convention for the Abolition
of Import and Export Prohibitions and
Restrictions.
In 1933, President Roosevelt gave notice
of termination (which was withdrawn subse-
quently) of the 1931 Treaty of Extradition
with Greece.
In 1936, President Roosevelt approved a
protocol Cdeemed to be notice of termination)
terminating the 1871 Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation with Italy.
In 1939, President Roosevelt gave notice
of termination of the 1911 Treaty of Com-
merce and Navigation with Japan.
19791
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In 1944, President Roosevelt gave notice
of denunciation of the 1929 Protocol to
the Inter American Convention for Trade-
mark and Commercial Protection.
In 1954, President Eisenhower gave
notice of withdrawal from the 1923 Con-
vention on Uniformity of Nomenclature
for the Classification of Merchandise.
In 1962, President Kennedy gave notice
of termination of the 1902 Convention on
Commercial Relations with Cuba.
In 1965, President Johnson gave notice
of denunciation, subsequently withdrawn,
of the 1929 Warsaw Convention concerning
international air travel. 8
This article undertakes a reanalysis of the in-
stances discussed by Hansell. As will be shown, none of
these instances serves to substantiate the State Depart-
ment claim that the President may withdraw from or ter-
minate treaties on his own initiative, i.e., without
Senate or congressional approval. 9 In each instance,
there had either been: (1) expressed or implied author-
ity given to the President by one or both houses of Con-
gress--no instance involved the President acting against
the majority will of Congress; (2) a material breach or
requested termination of the given treaty or convention
by one or more parties other than the United States; or
(3) a fundamental change in circumstances such that the
treaty was effectively void before the presidential
notice was given.
8. Id. at 3-4.
9. "Senate or congressional approval" is herein defined as:
(1) a law passed subsequent to a given treaty enactment effectively
authorizing the President to act contrary to the dictates of that
treaty; (2) proposed law(s) or resolution(s) awaiting certain
passage which articulate Senate or congressional support for the
President on a given matter; or (3) a consensual expression of
sentiment so pronounced as to clearly define the affirmative Senate
or congressional stance on a proposed course of action.
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Madison's Termination of the 1782 Treaty of Amity and
Commerce Betzyeen the United States & the
Netherlands
Supporters of the President's right to terminate
treaties without benefit of Senate or congressional
approval frequently begin the defense of their argument
with James Madison and his termination in 1815 of the
1782 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United
States and the Netherlands.1 0 A close look at the his-
torical circumstances surrounding that termination, how-
ever, shows that Madison's actions were academic, as the
treaty in question had already been annulled before
Madison chose to act.
Moore explained that:
[Iln 1793.. .a war broke out between the
United Provinces of the Netherlands and
France. In 1795 the Stadtholder [the
principal Dutch magistrate] was driven
from the country and the Batavarian
Republic was established. This was
succeeded by the Kingdom of Holland,
after which the country was incorporated
into the French Empire, and remained a part
of that empire until the abdication of
Napoleon. On the reconstruction of
Europe at the Congress of Vienna a new
kingdom was formed, called the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, in which was included
the territories which had formed the
United Provinces of the Netherlands.ll
During the period 1795-1813, a time in which "the
political existence of Holland was ... terminated,"
1 2
the rulers of the area once constituting the Netherlands
failed to honor the 1782 treaty.
10. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Oct. 8, 1782, United
States-Netherlands, 8 Stat. 32, T.S. No. 249.
11. 5 V. Moore, International Law Digest, 344-45 (1906).
12. [1873] Foreign Relations of the United States, pt. 2,
at 723.
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For a long series of years Holland was
not in a condition to execute her part
of the engagements of that treaty. Dur-
ing this long period there was none of
that reciprocity of advantages which is
the essence of treaties of amity and
commerce, but all that the treaty en-
gaged on the part of Holland toward the
United States was withheld and denied by
the government which controlled her. 1 3
By these facts, it is clear that the treaty was ef-
fectively both breached and abrogated with the overthrow
of the Netherlands Government in 1795.
That the Government of the new Kingdom of the
Netherlands felt the 1792 treaty annulled is evidenced
in their overtures for renewed peace and amity with the
United States in 1815. On February 24 of that year,
Dutch Minister Changnion proposed "as a base for the new
treaty to be concluded the text of the old treaty con-
cluded in 1782."14 Secretary of State Monroe, writing
on behalf of President Madison, reflected in his response
of April 15 a recognition on the American side that the
1782 treaty had long since been void.
The treaties between the United States
and some of the powers of Europe having
been annulled by causes proceeding from
the State of Europe for some time past,
and other treaties having expired, the
United States have now to form their
system of commercial intercourse with
every power, as it were, at the same time
... To this the President has readily
agreed. I have assured you of the willing-
ness of the President to make the ancient
treaty between our countries the basis of
the proposed one. 1 5
The President had no choice but to agree that the
1782 treaty was no longer in force. The one country
originally party to that treaty with the United States
had ceased to exist as a political entity. The "Kingdom
13. Id. at 724.
14. Id. at 721-22 (emphasis supplied).
15. Id.
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of the Netherlands" established at the Congress of
Vienna was technically a new country, not a vestige of
the "United Provinces of the Netherlands." As such, it
sought a new treaty of peace and amity, with the United
States only using the 1782 treaty as a guide for the
1815 edition.
In 1815 President Madison, without authorization
from the Senate or from Congress, declared the 1782
treaty annulled. As shown, however, that act was
declaratory.
McKinleyts Denunciation of the 1850 Commercial Conpen-
tion with 6 itzerland
The only other instance in the nineteenth century
of supposed independent [presidential] abrogatory action
was McKinley's denunciation of articles VIII-XII of the
1850 United States Convention of Friendship, Reciprocal
Establishments, Commerce, and Extradition with Switzer-
land.16
According to these articles, Switzerland was to en-
joy most-favored-nation status vis-A-vis the United
States. Article X for example, stated that "... each
of the contracting parties hereby engages not to grant
any favor in commerce to any Nation, Union of Nations,
State, or Society, which shall not immediately be enjoy-
ed by the other party."
The 1850 Convention remained operative through 1899,
at which time, the State Department maintains, President
McKinley denounced the articles without benefit of Sen-
ate or congressional approval. But, as the following
narrative shows, this was not the case.
On July 24, 1897, Congress passed a Tariff Act
which read, inter alia: "The President.. .is hereby,
authorized... to enter into negotiations with the govern-
ments of those countries exporting to the United States
the ab.ove-mentioned articles, or any of them, with a
view to the arrangement of commercial agreements in
which reciprocal and equivalent concessions may be
16. Convention on Friendship, Reciprocal Establishments,
Commerce, and Extradition, Nov. 25, 1850, United States-Switzer-
land, 11 Stat. 587, T.S. 353.
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secured in favor of the products and manufactures of the
United States."18 Shortly following the enactment of
the 1897 Tariff Act, the United States entered with
France into a reciprocity agreement of the type speci-
fied by the Act.19 About a month thereafter the Swiss
government claimed under articles 8, 9, 10, & 12 of the
1850 Convention that "Swiss products may enjoy, on
entering the territory of the Union, the concessions
granted to France" in the United States-France reciproc-
ity agreement.
2 0
The United States response indicated that "the most-
favored-nation clause does not entitle a third govern-
ment to demand the benefits of a special agreement of
reciprocity," 21 and that such clauses "were never in-
tended as a surrender of the right of either nation to
independently adjust the interests of its special com-
merce with any other country by special and mutually
compensatory contract. "22
As the Swiss Government had offered no reciprocal
concessions of the type offered by France, they, the
Swiss, were in no position, barring compensatory nego-
tiations with the United States, to press their claim
for equal commercial treatment, As Secretary Hay ex-
plained, the United States policy was:
.,.to treat the commerce of all friendly
nations with equal fairness, giving
exceptional 'favors' to none. Should
this Government continue to give to Swiss
products gratuitously all advantages
which other countries only acquire for
an equivalent compensation, it would
expose itself to the just reproaches of
other Governments for its exceptional
favoritism. We desire that our friendly
international policy should be main-
tained in its uniform application to all
our commercial relations. 2 3
17. Id, at 989,
18. Tariff Act of 1897, 30 Stat. 151.
19. [18991 Foreign Relations of the United States, at 740.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 741.
22. Id. at 746.
23. Id. at 748,
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As the President was authorized by the 1897 Act to
conclude only commercial agreements with countries mak-
ing reciprocal concessions, he had no choice but to
either denounce articles VIII-XII of the 1850 Swiss Con-
vention or to terminate that convention in its entirety.
That he had no choice was clear by (1) the decision that
"it was incumbent upon the President, charged with the
conduct [of] negotiations with foreign governments and
also the duty to take care that the laws of the United
States are faithfully executed, to reach a conclusion
as to the inconsistency between the provisions of the
treaty and the provisions of the new law"24; (2) the
fact that the 1897 Act was clearly in conflict with
articles VIII-XII; and (3) the fact that "[s]ince the
President cannot enforce two equally valid laws which
are in conflict, he is compelled to select that which
most reflects the current will of the Congress." 2 5
Accordingly, President McKinley, upon receiving
final word from the Swiss Government that no negotia-
tions for a reciprocal agreement were desired by that
Government, gave notice (as provided for in article
XVIII of the 1850 Convention) "of the intention of the
United States to arrest the operations of Articles VIII
to XII, inclusive, of the convention signed on the 25th
day of November, 1850.",26 Termination of those articles
became effective one year after McKinley's denunciation
on March 23, 1900.27
Wilson's 1920 Abrogation of 1891 Treaty with Belgium
On March 5, 1915, Congress passed the Seamen's Act.2
8
Article 16 of that Act specifically directed the Presi-
dent to terminate any articles in existing treaties or
conventions that were in conflict with the provisions
24. Van der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114, 118
(1936).
25. 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 580, 592 (1967).
26. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 19,
at 754.
27. 11 C. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agree-
ments of the United States of America 1776-1949, 894.
28. Seamen's Act of 1915, Pub. L. No. 64-302, 38 Stat. 1164
(codified in scattered sections of 18, 33, and 46 U.S.C.).
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of the Act. 29 Pursuant to article 16, notice was given
to States party to twenty-five different treaties .30
One treaty so affected was the 1891 Treaty of Amity,
Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and
the Congo.31 On July 6, 1915, the United States gave
notice to Belgium, the power then sovereign over the
Congo, of its intention to terminate article 5 of the
1891 treaty as of July 1, 1916. On June 29, 1916 the
Belgian Government responded:
As regards the Treaty of January 24,
1891 with the former Independent State
of the Kongo, the Government of the
King desiring, on its side, to make
modifications in several of its pro-
visions, considers that the best solu-
tion consists in terminating the con-
vention itself. I should be obliged
to you, Mr. Consul, if you would be
good enough to inform the American
Government and request it to make
formal acknowledgement of this denun-
ciation to the Belgian Government.
3 2
On November 11, 1916, the State Department, appar-
ently not realizing that the June 29 letter was an ef-
fective denunciation of the 1891 Treaty by the Belgian
Government, responded:
In view of the fact that the Govern-
ment of the United States has given
notice of the abrogation of Article 5
of this Treaty, in pursuance of the
Act of March 4, 1915, which notice has
been accepted by the Belgian Govern-
ment, that Government may not consider,
as does the Government of the United
States, that notice of the denunciation
of the Treaty as a whole should more
appropriately be given on behalf of the
other contracting party by the Govern-
ment of Belgium.33
29. The authority of Congress to issue this directive was
upheld in the Van der Fleyde case, supra note 24.
30. 5 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 309-10 (1943).
31. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Jan. 24, 1891,
United States-Congo, 27 Stat. 826, T.S. 60.
32. [1916] Foreign Relations of the United States, at 34.
33. Id. at 35.
[VOL. 6
1979] ABUSE OF HISTORY 37
If we overlook the redundancy of this State Depart-
ment response for a moment, one thing is clear: that the
State Department felt it was their place to terminate
only the article in conflict and not to terminate the
treaty in its entirety. The latter act they felt to be
the right of the Belgian Government.
On December 31, 1916, Belgium replied that the let-
ter of June 29, 1916, "was for the very purpose of giv-
ing the Government of the United States notice by the
King's Government of the termination of that Convention
as a whole ... the Treaty of January 24, 1891 will be
deemed to have been denounced on July 1, 1916."34
The American Government was slow to acknowledge
the denunciation. It was not until over four years
later, December 13, 1920, that the American Ambassador
wrote to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs:
My Government is pleased to acknowledge
that notice as given and released July
1, 1916. As the Treaty of Amity, Commerce
and Navigation, concluded on January 24,
1891, between the United States and the
Independent State of the Kongo contains
no stipulation respecting termination
thereof or the period required for the
giving of notice of termination, my
Government feels that it may assume that
the wishes of the Belgian Government may
best be met by considering that the
treaty terminated at the expiration of
such a period of notice as customarily
is provided for in treaties of amity and
navigation.
My Government is therefore pleased
to regard the treaty as having ceased to
be operative on July 1, 1917, at the
expiration of one year from the date of
the notification of the Belgian Govern-
ment.35
As this brief review of the correspondence between
the American and Belgian Governments shows, the termina-
34. Id. at 36.
35. [1920] Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. I,
at 208-09.
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tion of the treaty of 1891 was a three part process:
(1) Denunciation by the President of article 5 of the
treaty (pursuant to article 16 of the 1915 Seamen's
Act); (2) Belgium's termination of the entire 1891
treaty on June 29, 1916; and C3) State Department
acknowledgement of Belgium's termination on December
13, 1920.
In reality, President Wilson's "act of termination"
was no more than a pro forma acknowledgement of the
termination already effected by Belgium. Consequently,
it serves no precedential purpose for the State Depart-
ment argument.
Coolidge and the Smuggling Treaty with
Mexico
The termination on March 2 , 1927, of the 1925
Smuggling Treaty with Mexico,30 came in direct response
to several years of turbulent relations between the
United States and the Mexican Republic. The sources of
the turbulence were numerous. First, there was a fear,
fueled by Secretary of State Kellogg, that the Mexican
Government of President Calles was a Bolshevist strong-
hold that aimed to work against American interests in
Nicaragua and ultimately to take over the United
States. 3 7 Second, there was the religious concern,
espoused most notably by the "Knights of Columbus,"
that the Calles regime was waging war on Catholicism.38
Third, and clearly the most drastic from the congres-
sional point of view, were the property- and commercial-
oriented problems that grew out of confiscations by the
Mexican Government in the mid 1920's. It is this last
source that we shall examine in detail.
According to the Mexican Constitution (adopted in
1857), people, including American citizens, could ac-
quire property holdings both through individual and
36. Convention on the Prevention of Smuggling, Dec. 23,
1925, United States-Mexico. 44 Stat. 2358, T.S. 632.
37. 68 Cong. Rec. 1649 (1927).
38. Id. at 1692.
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corporate ownership. Throughout the last half of the
nineteenth century, Americans were encouraged to make
investments in Mexico to promote the development of
natural resources, transportation, and industry. 39
In 1917 a new Constitution was adopted with provi-
sions affecting agricultural, mining, and oil lands,
which the American Government thought threatened the
holdings of its nationals with retroactive confisca-
tion. Assurances to the contrary were received from
President Obregon in 1923.40 But when Calles succeeded
Obregon, the new President made it clear that he did
not feel bound by the assurances of his predecessor.
By late 1925, his new government Dad passed the Alien
Land Bill and the Petroleum Bill, 41 both of which
sanctioned the confiscation of American property inter-
ests pursuant to article 27 of the Mexican Constitution.
Reaction to the two bills was swift and pronounced.
Secretary Kellogg wrote to the Mexican Government on
December 31, 1925:
...my Government directs me to inform your
Excellency that it hereby reserves on
behalf of citizens of the United States
whose property interests are or may here-
after be affected by the application of
the two ... laws, all rights lawfully
acquired by them under the Constitution
of laws of Mexico in force at the time
of the acquisition of such property in-
terests and under the rules of interna-
tional law and equity, and points out
that it is unable to assent to an appli-
cation of the recent laws to American
owned properties so acquired which is,
or may hereafter, be retroactive and
confiscatory.4 2
39. [1927] Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. III,
at 214.
40. [1923] Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. II,
at 522.
41. [1925] Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. II,
at 522, 531.
42, Id. at 554.
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Congressional commentary on the confiscation prob-
lem was voluminous. For example, during a discussion in
the Senate over whether to submit property disputes to
international arbitration, a number of Senators took the
opportunity to condemn the Mexican practice:
Senator Lenroot:
With the purpose of Mexico to provide
lands for her people, we must all
sympathize. It is a most laudable
undertaking, and her right to make
such expropriation of lands of
American nationals upon proper in-
demnification has never been denied.
But article 27 of the Constitution
lays down rules for compensation and
method of payment that are shocking
to the American sense of justice....
The Constitution provides that the
payment for certain of the lands will
be made in 20 annual installments,
not cash as international law requires,
and the owner is further compelled to
accept state bonds, not bonds of the
Federal Government, but State bonds
as his compensation, In other words,
instead of compensation there is sub-
stituted a promise to pay of little
or no value. But quite apart from
this, the Mexican Government has not
even followed these provisions of the
Constitution. I understand that up to
this time there have been 121 agrarian
expropriations and 602 property seizures,
and not one dollar has been paid in
compensation and not a single bond has
been issued therefor, as the Constitution
provides ... I am frank to say that I
do not see how we can continue any
relations with Mexico unless she shall
have some regard for her solemn promises
and international obligations.3




The claims presented by our Government
to Mexico for indemnity had been
ignored, and after the Mexican War
and from then down until the present
day our Government has been compelled
to make representations because of
her violation of these rights of Ameri-
can citizens. These appeals and
representations have been in vain....
Hundreds of millions of dollars of
property has been destroyed, or con-
fiscated. But no reparations have
been paid and thousands of American
citizens have been deprived of all
their property because of the trans-
gressions of the Mexican Government or
its nationals .... We ought not to have
diplomatic relations with countries
which refuse to carry out their treaty
obligations and to govern their conduct
with the United States, as well as other




The adventurers and bandits ... who
have transformed themselves into what
they impudently call a republic and a
government, are engaged in the congenial
task of harassing, robbing, and out-
raging the easiest marks in the North
American continent - the American citi-
zens doing business on the other side of
the Rio Grande. They are doing it in
perfect safety, knowing that ... the
clerical yellows of this Republic will
applaud and defend them, and that
every minus 100 per cent American,
every red communist, every anti-American,
every piffling pacifist ... and every
political eunuch in the community will
cheer them and fly to the defense of
Calles and his cutthroats.45
44. Id. at 2229, 2231.
45. Id. at 2258.
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Many congressional remarks such as the three in-
cluded above were made in early 1927 in the context of
debates over whether relations had grown so poor with
Mexico that withdrawal of recognition of the Calles
Government or war were the only two viable alternatives
left to the United States. While the Congressmen were
deeply split over what course to take--most leaning in
the direction of trying to work out a peaceable solution
--they were in almost unanimous accord that something
had to be done to prohibit the confiscation of American
commercial and property interests.
This, then, was the political climate of the mid
1920's. The relation between this climate and the
termination of the 1925 Smuggling Treaty with Mexico is
evident in the phrasing of the termination notice sent
by Kellogg to the Mexican Government on March 21, 1927:
The Convention between the United States
and Mexico to prevent smuggling and for
certain other objects was signed December
23, 1925, ratified March 11, 1926, and
proclaimed March 18, 1926. It went into
effect so far as the United States was
concerned upon March 28, 1926. By its
terms the Convention was to remain in
force for one year, upon the expiration
of which period, if no notice of a desire
to terminate it had been given by either
party, it was to continue in force until
thirty days after either party should give
notice of termination.
It may be pointed out in this con-
nection that the United States has no
commercial treaty with Mexico, and that
in the circumstances it is not deemed
advisable to continue to effect an
arrangement which might in certain con-
tingencies bind the United States to
cooperation for the enforcement of laws
or decrees relating to the importation
of commodities of all sorts into another
country with which this Government has
no arrangement, by treaty or otherwise,
safe-guarding American cgimerce against
possible discrimination.4 o
46. 11927] Foreign Relations of the United States, vol.
at 230-31.
III,
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By this notice it is clear that the State Depart-
ment had reassessed the Treaty since its enactment in
late 1925. Confiscations during the ensuing year
demonstrated that decisive steps had to be taken to pro-
tect American property and commerce. The most appro-
priate move was to terminate the 1925 Treaty under which,
as pointed out in the termination notice, the American
Government was powerless to prevent discriminatory
action against American commerce. This the President
did in 1927.
It is true that the President did not seek official
approval of Congress before or subsequent to terminating
the Treaty. Congressional sentiment at the time of the
termination, however, was strongly on the side of any
move that would help protect American commercial or
property interests in Mexico. There can be no question
but that Congress gave its tacit approval of the termi-
nation.
President Coolidge, then, was certainly not acting
without at least the implied consent of Congress when he
terminated the 1925 treaty.
Roosevelt's Termination of the 1927 Multilateral Tariff
Convention
The goals of the November 8, 1927, Convention on
the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and
Resolutions 7 are expressed in its preamble, which
reads:
Being guided by the conclusions of the
International Economic Conference held
at Geneva in May 1927, and agreeing
with the latter that import and export
prohibitions, and the arbitrary prac-
tices and disguised discriminations to
which they give rise, have had deplor-
able results, without the grave draw-
backs of these measures being counter-
balanced by the financial advantages
47. Convention on Abolition of Import and Export Prohibi-
tions, and Resolutions, opened for signature Nov. 8, 1927, 46
Stat. 2461, T.S. 811.
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or social benefits which were anti-
cipated by the countries which had
recourse to them;
Being persuaded that it is
important for the recovery and future
development of world trade that
Governments should abandon a policy
which is equally injurious to their
own and to the general interest;
Being convinced that a return to
the effective liberty of international
commerce is one of the primary condi-
tions of world prosperity; and
Considering that this object may
best be achieved by resort to simultan-
eous and concerned action in the form
of an international convention;
Have appointed their plenipoten-
tiaries ... [wiho ... have a eed to
the following provisions ...4f
On June 16, 1933, Congress passed the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act (NIRA).49 Section 3(e) of the
Act reads:
On his own motion, or if any labor
organization, or any trade or indus-
trial organization, association, or
group, which has complied with the
provisions of this title, shall make
complaint to the President that any
article or articles are being imported
into the United States in substantial
quantities or increasing ratio to
domestic production of any competitive
article or articles and on such terms
or under such conditions as to render
ineffective or seriously to endanger
the maintenance of any code or agree-
ment under this title, the President
may cause an immediate investigation
48. Id. at 2462.
49. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No.
73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 15, 23
and 40 U.S.C.).
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to be made by the United States Tariff
Commission, which shall give prece-
dence to investigations under this
subsection, and if, after such inves-
tigation and such public notice and
hearing as he shall specify, the
President shall find the existence of
such facts, he shall, in order to
effectuate the policy of this title,
direct that the article or articles
concerned shall be permitted entry
into the United States only upon such
terms and conditions and subject to the
payment of such fees and to such limi-
tations in the total quantity which
may be imported (in the course of any
specified period or periods) as he
shall find it necessary to prescribe
in order that the entry thereof shall
not render or tend to render ineffec-
tive any code or agreement made under
this title. In order to enforce any
limitations imposed on the total
quantity of imports, in any specified
period or periods, of any article or
articles under this subsection, the
President may forbid the importation
of such article or articles unless the
importer shall have first obtained
from the Secretary of the Treasury a
license pursuant to such regulations
as the President may prescribe. Upon
information of any action by the
President under this subsection, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall, through
the proper officers, permit entry of
the article or articles specified only
upon such terms and conditions and sub-
ject to such fees, to such limitations
in the quantity which may be imported,
and to such requirements of license,
as the President shall have directed.
The decision of the President as to
facts shall be conclusive. Any condi-
tion or limitation of entry under this
subsection shall continue in effect
until the President shall have and in-
form the Secretary of the Treasury that
the conditions which led to the imposi-
tion of such condition or limitation
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upon entry no longer exists.5 0
Clearly, if the President wanted to act pursuant to sec-
tion 3(e) by licensing imports or imposing embargoes, he
would be acting in violation of the 1927 Tariff Conven-
tion. It was incumbent upon the State Department, then,
to relieve the United States of its obligations under
that convention.
To say that the United States was bowing out of the
convention because of self-serving legislation, though,
would have been very embarrassing for the United States
Government. Thus, the State Department had to come up with
some other reason for withdrawal that they could cite
instead of that involving the conflict of laws. A series
of letters commencing three days after the passage of
the NIRA between the Acting Secretary of State (Phillips)
and the American Delegation to the Monetary and Economic
Conference (Hull) in London reflects State Department
concern. On June 19, 1933, Phillips wrote to Hull:
In a note dated June 14 British
Ambassador states that His Majesty's
Government has deemed it advisable
to avail themselves as from June 30
of their right to be relieved of the
obligations accepted by them in
accordance with the Import and Ex-
port Prohibitions and Restrictions
Convention "in order that they may be
free to enter into any agreements
bearing upon the question of prohibi-
tions, quotas and similar restrictions
which may result from the Monetary and
Economic Conference," adding that a
formal declaration of withdrawal has
been forwarded to the Secretary General
of the League of Nations.
This action by the British Govern-
ment and certain provisions of the new
Recovery Act which authorize the Presi-
dent to license imports and impose
embargoes make it imperative that we
give immediate consideration to the
question of what the United States
should do in respect of this Convention.
50. Id. at 196-97.
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Please telegraph immediately your
views and recommendations, bearing
in mind that only countries besides
ourselves which remain bound by the
Convention are Japan, Norway, Den-
mark and Netherlands.51
Hull responded on June 23, 1933, by suggesting that the
State Department say that the reason for withdrawing
from the Convention was that so many other nations had
already so withdrawn. In his letter, though, it is
obvious that he was offering this rationale in an at-
tempt to cover up the real reason for withdrawal, i.e.,
the conflict arising out of the enactment of the NIRA.
Hull wrote:
My judgment is that various consid-
erations, among which are the possible
developments of our domestic policy
and the decision of the British
Government, make withdrawal by the
American Government from the Import
and Export Prohibitions and
Restrictions advisable...
I desire therefore that the Department
notify the Secretary General of the
League of Nations of the American
withdrawal in conformity with the
requirements of the convention and
usual practice.
I am reluctant to take this action at
the present time. It is important
that it not be construed as evidence
of any new decision by the American
Government to shape its policy on
domestic rather than on international
lines. The note to the secretary
General besides, therefore, covering
the formal notification, should contain
an explanation in substance as follows:
51. [1933] Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. I,
at 784.
1979]
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
The Government of the United States
takes this action with regret. It has
been disappointed that so few govern-
ments have seen their way clear to be-
come parties to this agreement. Fur-
thermore, it would appear that in the
judgment of many governments the con-
vention has become somewhat unadapted
to present conditions. The recent
withdrawal of other governments has
emphasized this conclusion.
The Government of the United States
still favors a policy of abolition
either outright or gradual by inter-
national action of the type of
restriction in international commerce
which is dealt with in the convention.
It is prepared to participate in more
effective action directed towards that
end.
Lay this telegram before the President
for final decision and direction.
5 2
Sometime between June 23 and June 27, Phillips
presented Hull's suggestions to President Roosevelt. The
President immediately embraced those suggestions as the
proper course and directed Phillips, as Acting Secretary
of State, to give notice of the American Government's
withdrawal from the 1927 Convention to the Secretary
General of the League of Nations, effective June 29,
1933. Phillips acted acpqrdingly and the withdrawal
was effected on June 30.D
The State Department currently contends that Presi-
dent Roosevelt acted on his own initiative in termina-
ting United States involvement in the 1927 Convention.
It contends that the sole reason was that other coun-
tries had withdrawn, leading to the conclusion that the
convention was not fully adapted to current economic
and commercial conditions.54 If, however, we take care-
ful note of the timing as well as of the remarks in the
State Department correspondence printed above, observing





in the process that twenty-two of the twenty-nine coun-
tries party to the convention had already withdrawn from
the convention fully three years before the United
States chose to do so, the "official" contentions of the
State Department are seen to be illusory. This termina-
tion is certainly not one that adds any substantial fuel
to the State Department argument.
Roosevelt's Termination of the 1931 Treaty of Extradi-
tion with Greece
In Charlton v. Kelly, 5 5 the Court recognized the
President's right to terminate a treaty violated by
another party. In 1933, President Roosevelt threatened
to exercise that right in a dispute involving the May 6,
1931 Treaty of Extradition with Greece.5
6
Samuel Insull, former Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Middle West Utilities Co. and the
Mississippi Valley Utility Investment Co., sought refuge
in Greece in 1932 to escape a charge of embezzlement and
larceny.5 7 Upon request of the State Department, Insull
was arrested and detained by the Greek police on Novem-
ber 4, 1932.58 On December 27, 1932, however, a Greek
court rejected the United States request for extradition
in a trial that was conducted under questionable pro-
ceedings. American Charg6 in Greece Morris noted:
... unofficial evidence indicates
court violated both spirit and
letter of treaty in passing upon
actual substance of the indict-
ments and in pronouncing that the
proofs submitted do not constitute
a crime under American law.
Affidavits made by Floyd
Thompson, Oliver McCormick and E.
Davis, expressing their personal
opinion that Insull did not intend
to commit a crime but carried out
55. 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
56. Treaty of Extradition, May 6, 1931, United States-
Greece, 47 Stat. 2185, T.S. 855.
57. [1933] Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. II,
at 553.
58. Id. at 555.
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the money transfers as a normal
business transaction in the interest
of his companies, were introduced
by the defense attorneys without
opportunity of examination or chal-
lenge by prosecutor or states attor-
neys and accepted as weighty evi-
dence. Illinois state's attorneys
Bellows and Vlachos were present but
were not allowed to speak or even to
present rebuttal to defense through
Greek prosecutor.59
On April 29, 1933, the Secretary of State wrote to
Charge Morris that the case against Insull was actually
of much greater magnitude than at first thought. The
charge went beyond embezzlement and larceny to transfer
of property in contemplation of bankruptcy, in violation
of the bankruptcy laws of the United States. Secretary
Hull wrote:
Washington, April 29, 1933--l p.m.
Your dispatch No. 2386, March 18. The
Department desires you to request personal
interview with Greek Foreign Minister and
to inform him orally and in strictest
confidence that Federal authorities, as
result of involuntary petition in bank-
ruptcy filed on April 18, 1932, against
the Corporation Securities Company of
Chicago, have been investigating affairs
of that Company and operations of its
officers among whom is Samuel Insull.
United States Attorney at Chicago is pre-
paring to obtain indictments charging
accused officers and agents on five
counts with unlawfully, willfully,
knowingly, feloniously and fraudulently
transferring to Northern Trust Company,
National City Bank of New York, Continental
Illinois Bank and Trust Company, and Cen-
tral Hanover Bank and Trust Company, in
contemplation of bankruptcy of Corporation
Securities Company and while the Company
was insolvent, assets of the Company
amounting approximately to $2,330,820
with intent to defeat the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Acts.60
59. Id, at 556.
60. Id. at 560.
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Charg6 Morris relayed the message as requested.
On October 31, 1933, "the extradition of Insull was
refused again. "61 The decision of the court admitted
that the acts committed were violations of the law in
both countries but contended that the proof of criminal
intent was insufficient.
Hull responded angrily on November 2, 1933, that
"unless prompt action is taken by the Greek authorities
to reopen the case, the Department is considering in-
structing you to lodge an emphatic protest at the deci-
sion of the court and to give formal notice of this
Government's denunciation of our Extradition Treaty with
Greece. "62
Once it was made clear that the Greek Government
was not going to reopen the case,63 the American Minis-
ter to Greece (MacVeagh) wrote to the Greek Minister of
Foreign Affairs (Maximos) on November 5, 1933:
My Government finds it difficult to
reconcile this unusual decision with
the admission of the competent
authorities that the fugitive com-
mitted the acts with which he was
charged and that these acts are illegal
and fraudulent both in the United States
and in Greece. I am directed to add
that my Government considers the deci-
sion utterly untenable and a clear
violation of the American-Hellenic treaty
of extradition signed at Athens May 6,
1931.
Inasmuch as the Greek authorities have
now seen fit on two occasions to deny
the just requests of the United States
made under the provisions of the above
mentioned treaty, it is apparent that
this treaty, although similar in terms
to treaties which the United States has
found effective in extraditing fugi-
tives from other countries, cannot be
relied upon to effect the extradition
of fugitives who have fled to Greece.
61. Id. at 562.
62. Id. at 563.
63. Id. at 564.
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My Government therefore considers that
from the American point of view the
treaty is entirely useless. According-
ly I am instructed to give formal no-
tice herewith of my Government's denun-
ciation of the treaty with a view to
its termination at the earliest date
possible under its pertinent provisions.
6 4
The United States denunciation was issued with a
view to termination at the earliest date possible under
the provisions of the treaty, i.e., November 1, 1937.
Before that date, however, the United States and Greece
concluded and signed on September 2, 1937, a protocol of
interpretation of the article of the treaty which had
given rise to the divergence of the two governments in
the Insull case. Thereafter the United States, on
September 29, 1937, withdrew its denunciation. It was
not regarded as necessary to submit the protocol to the
Senate since it did not change the treaty as interpreted
by the United States. 6 5
In summary, the Insull case involved an American
citizen given asylum in Greece, in whose protection
Greece had no legitimate interest. The Greek Govern-
ment's refusal to grant extradition rights to the United
States was a clear violation of the 1931 treaty. Presi-
dent Roosevelt, in threatening to terminate the treaty
(note the termination was never effected - the treaty
remains operative to this day), was doing nothing more
than acting upon a material breach by the other party to
the treaty. As Roosevelt's actions were not taken with-
out provocation, they do not serve as an example of a
President acting "solely on his own initiative."
Roosevelt's Termination of the 1871 Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation with Italy
The 1871 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between
Italy and the United States66 stipulated, inter alia,
64. Id. at 566.
65. 5 G. Hackworth, supra note 30, at 315.
66. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 26, 1871, United
States-Italy, 17 Stat. 845, T.S. 177.
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that neither country could discriminate against the com-
merce of the other. In 1936, Italy broke with provisions
of that treaty by not giving appropriate preferential
treatment to American goods. Acting Secretary of State
Moore wrote in November, 1936, for example, that "[nlu-
merous Italian products notably have been accorded ...
reduced rates [as per the treaty] without any corres-
ponding quid pro quo from the Italians. ,,7
In 1934, Congress passed the Trade Agreements Act. 6 8
Section 350 of the Act read:
Sec. 350. (a) For the purpose of
expanding foreign markets for the
products of the United States (as
a means of assisting in the present
emergency in restoring the American
standard of living, in overcoming
domestic unemployment and the pre-
sent economic depression, in increas-
ing the purchasing power of the
American public, and in establish-
ing and maintaining a better rela-
tionship among various branches of
American agriculture, industry, min-
ing, and commerce) by regulating the
admissions of foreign goods into the
United States in accordance with the
characteristics and needs of various
branches of American production so
that foreign markets will be made
available to those branches of Ameri-
can production which require and are
capable of developing such outlets by
affording corresponding market oppor-
tunities for foreign products in the
United States, the President, whenever
he finds as a fact that any existing
duties or other import restrictions of
the United States or any foreign coun-
try are unduly burdening and restrict-
ing the foreign trade of the United
States and that the purpose above de-
clared will be promoted by the means
hereinafter specified, is authorized
from time to time--
67. [1936] Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. II.,
at 354,
68. Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48
Stat. 943 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354 (1965)).
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(1) To enter into foreign trade agree-
ments with foreign governments or instru-
mentalities thereof; and
(2) To proclaim such modifications of
existing duties and other import restric-
tions, or such additional import restric-
tions, or such continuance, and for such
minimum periods, of existing customs or
excise treatment of any article covered
by foreign trade agreements, as are re-
quired or appropriate to carry out any
foreign trade agreement that the President
has entered into hereunder. No proclama-
tion shall be made increasing or decreas-
ing by more than 50 per centum any exist-
ing rate of duty or transferring any arti-
cle between the dutiable and free lists.
The proclaimed duties and other import
restrictions shall apply to articles the
growth, produce, or manufacture of all
foreign countries, whether imported
directly, or indirectly: Provided, That
the President may suspend the application
to articles the growth, produce, or manu-
facture of any country because of its
discriminatory treatment of American com-
merce or because of other acts or policies
which in his opinion tend to defeat the
purposes set forth in this section; and
the proclaimed duties and other import
restrictions shall be in effect from
and after such time as is specified in
the proclamation. The President may at
any time terminate any such proclamation
in whole or in part.6 9
The 1934 Act, then, authorized the President to sus-
pend beneficial duties to imports from any country dis-
criminating against American exports. If President
Roosevelt had taken such action against Italy, though,
he would have been acting in violation of the 1871 Trea-
ty; that is, the 1871 Treaty and the 1934 Act were in
direct conflict. Thus, President Roosevelt had a choice:
either sanction the Italian treatment by doing nothing
(an option which would assuredly have received no backing
from any government official) or act pursuant to the most
69. Id. at 943-44.
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recent expression of congressional will (the 1934 Act) by
terminating the 1871 Treaty. On December 15, 1936, he
chose the latter course.
7 0
It should be noted parenthetically that Italy had,
by its prejudiced trade regulations, effectively breached
the 1871 Treaty before Roosevelt ever notified the
Italian Government of his intent to terminate. As was
the case with the Greek extradition breach, the President
had the authority to terminate this treaty if and when
Italy violated its terms.
President Roosevelt, then, had two reasons to termi-
nate the 1871 Treaty: an indirect congressional mandate
and a material breach by the other party to the treaty.
Here again, his act of termination does not stand as an
"independent act."
Roosevelt's Termination of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce
with Japan
If there were ever a case of a President acting on
implied congressional authority when terminating a trea-
ty, that case would be Roosevelt's termination in 1939
of the 1911 Commercial Treaty with Japan.7 1 The Treaty,
proclaimed on February 21, 1911, gave Japan most-favored-
nation status with respect to the United States. Pur-
suant to maintaining that status, Japan agreed not to
discriminate against the United States in any commercial
matter. 7
2
In the early 1930'sJapan attacked and took control
of Northern China.7 3 In 1938, the Japanese militarists
administering the captured area began imposing a series
of restrictions on American and other foreign commercial
interests. By early 1939, the situation had grown par-
ticularly prohibitive from the United States perspective.
Secretary of State Hull wrote on March 9, 1939:
70. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 67,
at 356.
71. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1911, United
States-Japan, 37 Stat. 1504, T.S. 558.
72. Id. art. V.
73. 84 Cong. Rec. 10761-10762 (1939).
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
The Government of the United States
regards the export restrictions which
have been announced in North China as the
most comprehensive discrimination against
the United States and other foreign coun-
tries and in favor of Japan which has yet
been established in North China by Japa-
nese authorities, and as a virtual nulli-
fication in that area of the Open Door so
far as import and export trade is con-
cerned. The proposed measures would
automatically increase the price of ex-
ports by a large margin in terms of
foreign currencies, and probably have the
effect of reducing markedly exports to
foreign countries other than Japan, and
pari pasau of reducing imports from those
countries while leaving trade between
that area and Japan virtually unrestricted
During the past year the exchange value
of the currencies in circulation in
North China has been considerably depre-
ciated and prices in that area have
become more or less adjusted to this
depreciated value; if exports are quoted
suddenly in terms of a new currency
whose value is maintained by exchange
control at an artificially high level in
terms of foreign currencies North China's
foreign trade will tend to suffer and
imports to decline along with exports.
Meanwhile it is clear that Japanese trade
will not only be damaged by the proposed
restriction but be benefited by the new
measures. These considerations give added
force to the objection which the American
Government has repeatedly advanced to
institution of trade or exchange control
by Japanese authorities in North China,
the basis of such objection being that
all trade with North China would thereby
become subject to Japanese discretion
and that equality of opportunity would
no longer be possible.74
74. [1939] Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. III,
at 375.
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A number of American companies in North China reported
great commercial difficulties. Universal Leaf Tobacco
Company and Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, for example,
indicated that their business was being seriously re-
stricted by the Japanese regulations.7 5
Just to what extent Japan was stifling all commer-
cial interests but its own in China was indicated in an
article cited by Consul General Gauss at Shanghai to
Secretary Hull on March 23, 1939:
In summary, it is suggested that
this Introductory Survey of China's trade
for 1938 provides information from
which generalizations may be made re-
garding the effects of the first full
year of hostilities upon the foreign
trade of China. It indicates Japan's
steadily increasing power, by the oc-
cupation of China's ports, fixing of
its tariffs, detention of its Customs
revenues, and control, by means of
blockade and other restrictions, of its
exports to exert pressure upon the
Chinese Government and to displace the
trade of other nations in China. It
shows that these measures have already
brought about a large increase in
Japanese trade, both proportionately
and in actual value, and have caused
decreases in the trade of each of its
important rivals. The report brings
out the significant fact that in North
China where Japanese control is most
complete the benefit to Japanese trade
and the damage to the trade of other
nations is the greatest. The most dis-
turbing fact brought out, however, is
that Japan has caused the United States
to suffer the greatest loss of China
trade suffered by any country and has
succeeded in displacing the United
States gs the leading nation in China's
trade.7
75. Id. at 391.
76. Id. at 389.
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Two conclusions may be drawn from this discussion
of the Northern Chinese situation. First, it is clear
that the Japanese, by harassing American commercial in-
terests, were at the very least perilously close to vio-
lating the 1911 Commercial Treaty with the United States.
Second, by promoting Japanese business in Northern China
at the expense of foreign competitors, and by compromis-
ing China's territorial integrity through military occu-
pation, Japan was clearly in violation of the so-called
Nine Power Treaty of 1922.
By the terms of the 1922 Treaty, the contracting
powers (which included Japan and the United States)
agreed:
(1) to respect the sovereignty, the
independence, and the territorial and
administrative integrity of China;
(2) to provide the fullest and most
unembarrassed opportunity to China to
develop and maintain for herself an
effective and stable government; (3)
to use their influence for the purpose
of effectually establishing and main-
taining the principle of equal oppor-
tunity for the commerce and industry
of all nations throughout the territory
of China; (4) to refrain from taking
advantage of conditions in China in
order to seek special rights or
privileges which would abridge the
rights of subjects of citizens of
friendly states and from countenancing
action inimical to the security of
such states. 7 7
Not only was it felt in the United States that Ja-
pan was in violation of the Nine Power Treaty, but there
was also strong sentiment that the United States was in-
directly violating the same treaty by supplying Japan
with large quantities of raw materials that ultimately
became munitions for the Japanese war effort in China.
Senator Schwellenbach remarked on August 2, 1939:
77. Treaty Relating to the Principles and Policies to be
Followed in Matters Concerning China, Feb. 6, 1922, 44 Stat. 2113,
2116, T.S. 723, 726.
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In our actions in reference to Japan
and by our violation of the Nine Power
Pact, we became just as flagrant a vio-
lator of international agreements as any
other nation in the world. And it does
not speak very well for us to be casting
reflection upon other nations when we,
just because we can make some money out
of it, just because we can make some pro-
fits out of it, proceed to furnish, I
think, probably 70 percent--I have not
attempted to segregate these figures, but,
as I pointed out, it is 56 percent of the
total amount, and I think 70 percent of
the really essential material that Japan
is using in the transaction of this war.]
8
The various Japanese transgressions provoked sub-
stantial outrage in congressional circles. As a result,
a number of resolutions arose that aimed either to re-
lieve the United States of its obligations under the 1911
Commercial Treaty or to terminate those commercial deal-
ings with Japan that compromised United States assur-
ances given in the Nine Power Treaty. On April 27, 1939,
Senator Pittman, the chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, ordered printed in the Congressional Record
"Senate Joint Resolution 123":
Resolved, etc., That the Presi-
dent is authorized to place restric-
tions upon trade and commerce between
the United States and any state, a
party to the treaty (nine-power pact)
between the United States, Belgium,
the British Empire, China, France,
Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, and
Portugal, regarding principles and
policies to be followed in matters
concerning China, signed at Washington,
February 6, 1922, when he shall ad-
judge and decree that such state is
endangering the lives of our citizens
or depriving them of their legal
rights and privileges through the
commission of acts or through fail-
ure to perform acts in violation of
the express provisions and guarantees
in said treaty: Provided, That this
78. Id. at 10766.
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act shall not authorize any restric-
tions upon exports of agricultural
products of the United States or
possessions over which it has sover-
eignty, and: Provided further, That
in the enforcement of the provisions
of this act there shall be no dis-
crimination between states, parties
to said treaty, who are equally vio-
lators thereof.
Sec. 2. Such restrictions may be
imposed by the President from time to
time through embargoes upon the export
and import of certain commodities,
articles, and materials, and by restric-
tions upon monetary exchange and credits
specifically limited and defined in pro-
clamations made by the President.
It is the intent of Congress that
the authority herein granted shall be
exercised to the extent only as may
be considered necessary in the protec-
tion of the lives of our citizens and
their rights and privileges guaranteed
under said treaty, and not until after
the President has made every reasonable
effort to induce said State to comply
with the terms of said treaty as affect-
ing the lives of our citizens and their
rights and privileges.
Sec. 3. That the President shall
not have authority to impose any of
the restrictions provided for in this
act or to issue any proclamations
relative thereto, except as provided
in section 5, until 10 days after he
shall have submitted to both branches
of Congress while in session the pro-
clamation he intends to make relative
to such restrictions, accompanied by
a full report of the facts, evidence,
and diplomatic correspondence bearing
upon the necessity for his intended
acticn.
Sec. 4. The President shall carry
out the provisions of this act through
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proclamations which shall have the
force of law and through appropriate
and consistent rules and regulations
that he may from time to time promul-
gate.
Sec. 5. When a proclamation has
been made under the provisions of
this act and thereafter the Presi-
dent finds that said violations of
said treaty have ceased, or when the
President determines further enforce-
ment of the provisions of the act are
unnecessary to secure the safety of
the lives of our citizens and the pro-
tection of their said rights and pri-
vileges, then he shall so proclaim,
and thereupon and thereafter all
former proclamations shall be deemed
repealed, and all acts and things done
under such proclamations shall also be
deemed to be repealed and shall be of
no further force and effect. The
President may from time to time, by
proclamation annul or modify any
restrictions theretofore imposed.
Sec. 6. This act shall terminate
on the 1st day of May 1940, and all pro-
clamations issued thereunder and all
acts and things done by virtue of said
proclamations shall upon said date be
deemed repealed and cease to have force
and effect. 7 9
Senator Pittman's resolution implicitly suggested a cur-
tailing of normal commercial relations between the Uni-
ted States and the violating party, i.e,, Japan. Such
curtailment necessarily would mandate a termination of
the 1911 Treaty.
On June 1, Senator Schwellenbach introduced "Senate
Joint Resolution 143 ," in which was resolved:
79. S.J. Res. 123, 76th Cong., 2d Sess., 84 Cong. Rec. 4821
(1939).
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... [tihat in compliance with our trea-
ty engagements, and to conserve our
resources for national-defense pur-
poses, there shall be retained within
the United States, and denied export
therefrom, all goods, wares, merchan-
dise, munitions, materials, and sup-
plies of every kind and character, ex-
cept agricultural products, which there
is reason to believe will, if exported,
be used, directly or indirectly, in
violation of the sovereignty, or the in-
dependence, or the territorial or admin-
istrative integrity of any nation, whose
sovereignty, independence, and terri-
torial and administrative integrity the
United States is obligated by treaty to
respect.80
While Schwellenbach himself felt his resolution could
be adopted without terminating the 1911 Treaty, it was
clear from the discussion on the floor at the time the
resolution was introduced that a large number of those
Senators backing the resolution felt otherwise.81
On July 18, 1939 Senator Vandenburg introduced
"Senate Resolution 166," which read:
Resolved, that it is the sense
of the Senate that the Government of
the United States should give Japan the
6 months' notice required by the treaty
of 1911 for its abrogation, so that the
Government of the United States may be
free to deal with Japan in the formu-
lation of a new treaty and in the pro-
tection of American interests as new
necessities may require.
Resolved further, That it is the
sense of the Senate that the Government
of the United States should ask that
the Conference of Brussels of 1937, now
80. S. J. Res. 143, 76th Cong., 2d Sess., 84 Cong. Rec.
10783 (1939).
81. Id. at 10785.
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in recess, should be reassembled to
determine, pursuant to the express
provisions of the Nine Power Treaty
of Washington of 1922, whether Japan
has been and is violating said treaty,
and to recommend the appropriate
course to he pursued by the signa-
tories O2
It should be noted here that the need to protect American
(economic interests was the reason behind the suggested
termination of the 1911 Treaty.
Finally, on July 19, 1939, Representative Sterns
entered into the Congressional Record "House Resolution
264," another resolution favoring the notification of
Japan of the intention of the United States to abrogate
the Treaty of 19 11.b3
It is most significant that each of the listed res-
olutions received wholehearted backing in their respec-
tive chambers. Of the June 1 resolution, for example,
Senator Schwellenbach wrote, "Since I have been in Con-
gress I have never seen such a favorable response.'
8 4
The prevailing mood in both Houses of Congress in
mid-1939, then, was one of breaking off commercial re-
lations with Japan. As suggested above, this mood grew
out of the conviction that Japan had violated both the
1911 Commercial Treaty and the 1921 Nine Power Pact.
The obvious appropriate measure was to give notice of
the termination of the 1911 Treaty.
On July 26, 1939, before any of the four resolu-
tions had been officially adopted, the State Department
gave notice to the Japanese Government of the 1911
Treaty:
Washington, July 26, 1939.
Excellency: During recent years the
Government of the United States has
been examining the treaties of com-
merce and navigation in force between
82. S. Res. 166, 76th Congr., 2d Sess., 84 Cong. Rec. 9341
(1939).
83. Id. at 9544.
84. 84 Cong. Rec. 10766 (1939).
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the United States and foreign coun-
tries with a view to determining
what changes may need to be made
toward better serving the purposes
for which such treaties are concluded.
In the course of this survey, the
Government of the United States has
come to the conclusion that the Treaty
of Commerce and Navigation between
the United States and Japan which was
signed at Washington on February 21,
1911, contains provisions which need
new consideration. Toward preparing
the way for such consideration and
with a view to better safeguarding
and promoting American interests as
new developments may require, the
Government of the United States, act-
ing in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in Article XVII of the
treaty under reference, gives notice
hereby of its desire that this
treaty be terminated, and having
thus given notice, will expect the
treaty, together with its accompany-
ing protocol, to expire six months
from this date. 85
If we compare the phrase emphasized above with Senator
Vandenburg's resolution, we see the Senator's rationale
for termination directly reflected in the State Depart-
ment's notification. The State Department, as did Van-
denburg, held harassment of American interests the prime
reason to terminate the Treaty. And, again, "harassment
of American interests" was tantamount to a breach of the
1911 Treaty. Thus, the State Department was merely act-
ing in response to a material breach by the Japanese.
Despite the fact that Congress had not actually
voted on the four listed resolutions, it was steadfastly
behind the State Department's actions. Thus, notwith-
standing the fact that the State Department claimed this
to be an independent act of termination by an American
President,8 6 Roosevelt was effectively acting with over-
whelming congressional approval, and not independently
at all.
85. [1939] Foreign Relations of the United States, pt. 3,
at 559 (emphasis in original).
86. 5 G. Hackworth, supra note 30, at 331-32.
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Roosevelt's Denunciation of the 1929 Convention for
Trade Mark and Commercial
Protection
The 1929 Inter-Amprican Convention for Trademark and
Commercial Protection,07 assured the contracting states
that their respective manufacturers, industrialists, mer-
chants, and agriculturalists would enjoy reciprocal trade-
mark and commercial protection. This Convention was in
large part an effort to reconcile the different judicial
systems which prevailed in the several American repub-
lics.
On September 29, 1944, Secretary of State Hull gave
notice of denunciation by the United States of the Proto-
col to the 1929 Convention:
September 29, 1944
The Director General, of the Pan Ameri-
can Union.
Sir:
As the result of the experiences
of the last several years, the Govern-
ment of the United States of America
has come to the conclusion that the
Inter-American Trademark Bureau at
Havana and the Protocol on the Inter-
American Registration of Trade Marks
signed at Washington on February 20,
1929 have failed to serve any purpose
which would adequately justify the
annual quota of funds contributed by
it for the support of the Bureau.
Accordingly, the Government of
the United States of America, acting
in conformity with the provisions of
the third paragraph of Article 19 of
the Protocol under reference, gives
notice hereby of its denunciation of
the Protocol, and, having thus given
notice, understands that the Protocol
will cease to be in force as regards
87. Convention on Trademark and Commercial Protection, open-
ed for signature Feb. 20, 1929, 46 Stat, 2907, T.S, 833.
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the United States of America upon
the expiration of one year from
the date of this notice. 8 8
In a letter that same day to certain United States diplo-
matic officers in the American republics, Hull elabora-
ted on the reasons for the denunciation. Most notably
he cited the "past ineffectiveness" of the convention,8 9
suggesting that some of the states party to the conven-
tion had not fulfilled their obligations; that is, there
had been, prior to American denunciation, an effective
breach by parties other than the United States. Presi-
dent Roosevelt (through Secretary Hull), then, was mere-
ly exercising his authority to denounce a violated trea-
ty when he denounced the 1929 Convention.
Eisenhower's Termination of the 1923 Multilateral Nomen-
clature Convention
On May 3, 1923, the United States became a party to
the Convention on Uniformity of Nomenclature for Classi-
fication of Merchandise,90 Hansell remarks:
Under the 1923 Convention the
parties had agreed to employ the
Brussels nomenclature of 1913 in
their statistical reporting of
international commerce, either
exclusively or as a supplement to
other systems. However, the Brus-
sels system of 1913 had become out-
dated. In 1950 the United Nations
developed what is known as the
Standard International Trade Clas-
sification. Following this develop-
ment was the adoption of the Uni-
form Central American Customs Nomen-
clature by the Committee on Economic
Cooperation of the Ministers of
Economy of Central America sponsored
88. Dep't of State. Bull. No, 11, 1944 at 442 (emphasis in
original).
89. State Dept. 710. D4/9-2944, Sept. 29, 1944.
90. Convention on Uniformity of Nomenclature for Classifi-




by the U.N. Economic Commission for
Latin America. This nomenclature
employed the Standard International
Trade Classification as its basis.
In 1950 the United Nations Economic
and Social Council urged governments
to use the Standard International
Trade Classification.
Under these circumstances, the
Tenth Inter-American Conference of
American States, meeting at Caracas,
Venezuela in 1954, adopted Resolution
LXXXVIII on Customs Nomenclature.
The Resolution after reciting the
above history of the matter, made the
following recommendation:
1. That, in as much as the Brussels
nomenclature of 1913 has become out-
dated and has thereby rendered inappli-
cable the Santiago Convention on Uni-
formity of Nomenclature for the Classi-
fication of Merchandise, the ratify-
ing Governments consider the desir-
ability of withdrawing from the said
Convention, as provided in Article V,
in order that the Convention may be
legally abandoned by all the parties.
2. That the Member States take
cognizance of the method used in the
development of the new Uniform Central
American Customs Nomenclature, accom-
plished with the assistance of the
United Nations and the Inter-American
Statistical Institute, and seek to
adopt and put in effect as soon as
possible the Standard International
Trade Classification of the United
Nations, either exclusively or as a
supplement to the national systems.
(U.S. Archives, 74D431.)
The U.S. notice of withdrawal
from the 1923 Convention simply
quoted recommendation 1 of Resolu-
tion LXXXVIII, and said that "in
accordance with the foregoing recom-
mendation," the U.S. Government was
1979]
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giving its notice of withdrawal.9 l
This case marks a clear application of the rebus sic
stantibus doctrine. The Harvard Research in Internation-
al Law remarks concerning rebus:
The idea common to most concepts
of the doctrine is that a treaty
becomes legally void in case there
occurs a change in the state of facts
which existed at the time the parties
entered into the treaty. It is
generally admitted, however, that
not every change in those facts
terminates the binding force of a
treaty. ... Many writers affirm
that a change in the state of facts
terminates the binding force of
a treaty only when the parties
entered into the treaty with
reference to this state of facts
and envisaged its continuance un-
changed as a determining factor
which moved them to undertake the
obligations stipulated. 92
In the instant case, it was assumed at the time the 1923
Convention was signed that the 1913 Brussels nomencla-
ture would be the nomenclature used in the future clas-
sification of merchandise. When the new nomenclature
superseded the old in the early 1950's, the main deter-
mining factor in the 1923 Convention became anachronis-
tic. The 1923 Convention, as a result, became, accord-
ing to rebus doctrine, effectively null and void.
It should be noted that this was not a case of im-
possibility. Theoretically, at least, the United States
could have continued to use the 1913 nomenclature after
1954. Obviously, however, since all of the states party
to the Tenth Inter-American Conference were abandoning
that nomenclature, it would have been absurd for the
United States to continue its use. The United States
Government, then, had no practical choice but to act in
accordance with Resolution LXXXVIII by announcing Ameri-
can withdrawal from the 1923 Convention. This it did
91. H. Hansell, supra note 7, at 419-20.
92. 5 G. Hackworth, supra note 30, at 349.
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through notice given by President Eisenhower on May 24,
19-54.
The President, then, was doing nothing more than
exercising the only practical option open to him in
light of the fundamental change in circumstances that
had transpired since the signing of the 1923 Convention,
He was not acting on his own initiative or without
j-ustifiable provocation.
Kennedyts Termination of the 1902 Commercial Convention
with Cuba
On August 21, 1962, President Kennedy gave notice
of the termination of the 1902 Commercial Relations Con-
vention with Cuba.9 3 This step was an integral part of
the United States economic embargo of the Castro regime
in Cuba, declared on February 2, 1962, in which the
United States was joined by the Organization of American
States. 94
President Kennedy had absolute congressional sanc-
tion for his action, as is shown by the following:
Cl) By the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, "En]o
assistance shall be furnished under this Act to the
present Government of Cuba. As an additional means of
implementing the carrying into effect the policy of the
preceding sentence, the President is authorized to esta-
blish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade be-
tween the United States and Cuba." 95
(2) The Export Control Act of 1948 authorized the
President to control exports for the purpose of prevent-
ing national shortages, protecting national security and
promoting foreign policy.96 Significantly, the Congres-
sional Quarterly Almanac reported in late 1962:
President Kennedy Feb. 3 pro-
claimed an almost total embargo
on U.S. trade with Cuba, effective
93. Convention on Commercial Relations, Dec. 11, 1902, lUni-
ted States-Cuba, 33 Stat. 2136, T.S. 427.
94. 13 Cong. Q. Almanac 295-98, 331, 333 (1962).
95. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75
Stat. 424, 444, 445 (codified in scattered sections of 22, 42
U.S.C.).
96. 50 U.S.C. app. 2021-41 (1976).
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Feb. 7. He acted under the pro-
visions of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 and the Export Control
Act of 1948 as amended. The move
which exempted from the ban some
shipments to Cuba of U.S. food and
medicines, was expected to deprive
the Castro government of about $35
million in foreign exchange (mostly
from sales of tobacco to the U.S.)
and thus "reduce the capacity of the
Castro regime... to engage in acts of
aggression (and) subversion.",9 7
(3) According to the Trading With the Enemy Act of
1917, the President had virtually unlimited power to
regulate "through any agency that he might designate, or
otherwise," all foreign exchange transactions with any
foreign country or foreign national when the United
States is at war or when the President has declared a
state of national emergency.9 8
(4) By the Mutual Assistance Act (otherwise known
as the Battle Act), the President could impose an em-
bargo on United States arms and strategic goods to the
Communist bloc. 9 9
(5) Finally, the President had the authority to
terminate commercial relations with Cuba as a result of
the Punta del Este Agreement of January, 1962, by which
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of most American na-
tions resolved, in application of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947:100
1. To suspend immediately trade
with Cuba in arms and implements
of war of every kind.
2. To charge the Council of the
Organization of American States, in
accordance with the circumstances
and with due consideration for the
97, 13 Cong. Q. Almanac 333 (1962).
98. Id. at 296,
99. Id.
100. Treaty, of Reciprocal Assistance, opened for signature
Sept. 2, 1947, 63 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. 1838.
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constitutional or legal limitations
of each and every one of the member
states, with studying the feasi-
bility and desirability of extending
the suspension of trade to other
items, with special attention to
items of strategic importance.
3. To authorize the Council of the
Organization of American States to
discontinue, by an affirmative vote
of two-thirds of its members, the
measure or measures adopted pursuant
to the preceeding paragraphs, at
such time as the Government of Cuba
demonstrates its compatibility with
the purposes and principles of the
system.
President Kennedy, then, was acting under the au-
thority of four congressional acts and one agreement to
which the United States was party when he terminated the
1902 Commercial Convention with Cuba. His was an action
based on definitive legislative approval.
Johnson's Denunciation of the 1965 WFarsaw Convention
On November 15, 1965, President Johnson denounced
the so-called "Warsaw Convention."101 A press release
issued by the State Department on May 5, 1966 summarized
the events leading up to that denunciation.
The Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Transportation by Air, generally
known as the Warsaw Convention, was
negotiated in 1929 and is today one of
the principal multilateral agreements
applicable to international air trans-
portation. It establishes uniformity
of documentation and creates a uniform
body of law with regard to the rights
and responsibilities of passengers,
101, Convention on the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct.
12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876.
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shippers, and air carriers in inter-
national air transportation. In
addition, its application has had the
effect of making it unnecessary for
the courts of the United States to
decide many difficult and unsettled
international conflicts of law issues.
On the other hand, in cases of in-
jury or death to passengers, the Con-
vention limits the liability of air
lines to only $8,300.
The Convention came into force on
13 February 1933. The United States
joined the Convention in 1934. Even-
tually, over ninety countries became
parties to the Convention.
In September 1955, following
several preparatory international
meetings under the auspices of the
International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO), and as a result
primarily of United States dissatis-
faction with the low limits of lia-
bility, a diplomatic conference was
called to amend the Warsaw Convention.
The conference, held at The Hague,
resulted in a Protocol that amended
the Warsaw Convention in several
respects. But despite urging by the
United States to reach agreement on
a higher limit, the conference agreed
to increase the limit only to $16,600.
The Protocol was transmitted to the
Senate on 24 July, 1959, but was not
acted upon.
In the summer of 1961, the Admin-
istration undertook a broad study of
the relationship of the United States
to the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol. The Interagency Group on
International Aviation (IQIA), which
is composed of representatives of
agencies and departments of the Govern-
ment having an interest in interna-
tional aviation affairs, was given the
task of studying the problem and making
appropriate recommendations. Between
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the summer of 1961 and 1964, the
IGIA conducted an intensive review
in consultation with interested
industry and public representatives.
In addition, public hearings were
held and the views of all interested
parties were invited at several
different stages of the study. After
full consideration, the IGIA made two
basic and related recommendations to
the Secretary of State; first, that
efforts be continued to ratify The
Hague Protocol, and, second, that
this be coupled with complementary
legislation providing for automatic
compulsory insurance in the amount
of $50,000. Together with The Hague
Protocol limit of $16,600, this would
have permitted a maximum recovery of
$66,600.
On 7 August 1964, the legislation
and the recommendation to ratify The
Hague Protocol were transmitted to
the Congress. The 88th Congress did
not act on the legislation or the
Protocol and the package proposal
was resubmitted, without change, on
30 April 1965.
On 26-27 May 1965, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee held hear-
ings on the Protocol.
The Foreign Relations Committee
issued its report on 29 June 1965. The
report indicated that "the Warsaw Con-
vention establishes uniform rules as
to the rights and obligations between
air carriers and users of international
transportation, and creates uniformity
with respect to transportation documents
required." The report noted, however
with the complementary insurance legis-
lation, maximum recoveries could be
had of $66,600. On this basis, the
Committee recommended ratification of
the Protocol but added that if the
legislation "is not enacted within a
reasonable time (in fact prior to the
74 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
adjournment of the 89th Congress),
the Department of State should take
immediate steps to denounce the War-
saw Convention and The Hague Protocol."
When Congress failed to take action
on the compulsory insurance legislation,
the Administration, like the Foreign
Relations Committee, concluded that The
Hague Protocol alone would not afford
adequate protection to the American
traveling public. If no supplementary
protection could be made available, then
withdrawal from the Convention and
reliance on the common law would afford
the best measure of protection. In
search of a supplementary measure that
would provide a satisfactory alterna-
tive to withdrawal from the Convention,
the Administration suggested that the
United States carriers voluntarily in-
crease their limits of liability to
$100,000. Such voluntary action is
permitted under Article 22 of the
Convention. After several meetings
and conversations, it became apparent
that some carriers were prepared to
agree on a limit of $50,000 but no
carrier was prepared to go as high
as the $100,000 limit suggested by
the Government. Moreover, some carriers
would not agree on any amount unless
the amount was also agreed upon by the
principal foreign international carriers.
Following further consideration
by the IGIA, it was decided that the
United States should deposit a notice
of termination of the Warsaw Convention
on 15 November 1965. Article 39 of the
Convention specifically permits such
action by any state party to the Con-
vention and provides that termination
takes effect six months after deposit
of the notice.1 0 2
102. 32 J. Air L. & Comm,, 243-45 (1966),
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The State Department felt that
before it could move toward denunci-
ation of the Warsaw Convention it had
to retrace some of its steps with the
Senate, particularly with the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. The State
Department had asked the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee to recommend ratifica-
tion of The Hague Protocol, and it
would be improper for the State Depart-
ment now to take steps to denounce the
Warsaw Convention without first asking
the Committee if it had any objection.
Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs Thomas C. Mann and
members of the Staff of the State De-
partment's Legal Adviser met with the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
Under Secretary Mann asked whether the
Committee would have any objection to
the State Department's moving toward
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention.
After some discussion Senator Fulbright,
Chairman of the Committee, indicated
that the Committee would have no objec-
tion and that the State Department was
free to move toward denunciation.IG3
The United States, as suggested above, gave notice
on November 15, to be effective May 15, 1966. Not only
did the President have the backing of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee for his action, but he had signifi-
cant support from the House as well. On August 12, 1965,
for example, resolutions were introduced by Representa-
tives Wolff and Tenger that strongly supported denuncia-
tion.1 0 4 Each introduction was accompanied by impassion-
ed explanation. Representative Tenger remarked:
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to sponsor
a resolution which expresses the sense
of the House of Representatives that
the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Con-
vention should not be ratified and
103. 31 J. Air L. & Comm., 301 (1965).
104, H. Res. 518 and H. Res, 519, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111
Cong. Rec. 20374-20378.
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further that the United States should
not adhere to any provision of the
Warsaw Convention which limits the
liability of international air
carriers to passengers on flights
covered by the Convention. The with-
drawal by the United States from this
treaty will assist American passengers
who may be injured in future airline
accidents and will afford necessary
protection to the estate and bene-
ficiaries of those Americans who may
be fatal victims of these tragic
accidents.
Our Nation stands as leader of the
free world because we have committed
ourselves to the protection of the
individual, his constitutionally
guaranteed freedoms, his rights, and
his pursuit of happiness. By with-
drawing from participation in the
Warsaw Convention, we will be in effect
restating our determination to protect
individual rights and we will be acting
in accord with basic principles of our
Nation. The principles of justice,
when balanced against our international
relations, tip the scales in favor of
withdrawal by the United States from
the Warsaw Convention and rejection of
the Hague Protocol.1 0
5
The text of the denunciation notice reflected the
concern of both Congress and the State Department over
unjust liability regulations and the clear desire of
those two bodies to have a more equitable set of regula-
tions enacted. At the time the notice of denunciation
was given, the State Department made it clear that it
would withdraw that notice if prior to its effective
date there were:
... reasonable prospect of an inter-
national agreement on limits of liability
in international air transportation in
the area of $100,000 per passenger or on
105. 111 Cong. Rec., 20376 (1965).
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uniform rules ... without any limit
of liability, and if, pending the
effectiveness of such international
agreement, there ... [were] a pro-
visional arrangement among the
principal international airlines
waiving the limits of liability up
to $75,000 per passenger.1 0
As it developed, the results of eleventh hour nego-
tiations met the State Department demands. The denuncia-
tion was accordingly withdrawn on May 14, 1966.107
It should be remarked that the withdrawal elicited
dismay in one circle. A group of Senators were hoping
for an even more drastic change in liability regulations
than was afforded by the last minute compromise. They
favored not withdrawing the denunciation until full pub-
lic hearings were held and the views of qualified and
interested persons determined.1 0 The withdrawal came
notwithstanding their complaints. The convention remains
in effect to this day.
It is clear that President Johnson had considerable
congressional support for his denunciation notice. While
it is true that no specific piece of legislation was
passed as of November 15, 1965, that gave him the author-
ity to denounce the Convention, it is just as true that
the mood of Congress as expressed by Resolution or Com-
mittee recommendation was decidedly one backing the de-
nunciation action. President Johnson, therefore, was not
acting independent of congressional authorization.
Conclusion and Postscript
The "past precedent" analysis introduced by the
State Department ultimately does nothing to aid the
presidential cause in the Goldwater v. Carter controver-
sy. As this discussion has shown, that analysis crumbles
in the face of detailed historical scrutiny. Not one in-
stance cited in the Hansell Memorandum involves a Presi-
dent withdrawing from or terminating a treaty on his own
106. U.S. Dep't. of State, Pub. No. 53, 924 (1965).
107. 32 J. Air L. & Comm. 248 (1966).
108. S. Res. 266, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 112 Cong. Rec. 9543
(1966).
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initiative; that is to say, the impetus behind the presi-
dential moves under examination came in each case from
sources other than the President himself.
That the argument set forth in this article is a
persuasive one emerges from a brief review of actual
judicial treatment of the "past precedent" issue in the
Goldwater case itself. Judge Gasch, in holding for the
plaintiffs, noted in the District Court opinion that,
"[tlaken as a whole, historical precedents support
rather than detract from the position that the power to
terminate treaties is a power shared by the political
branches of this government."'1 0 9 Gasch's conclusion was
reached without benefit of this article.
Subsequent to the handing down of the District
Court opinion, Senator Goldwater's attorneys requisi-
tioned this article to bolster the precedent argument
further still and submitted it as a brief to the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of ADpeals. That court
was within constitutional bounds in independently termi-
nating the Mutual Defense Treaty. Significantly, though,
the Court failed to draw upon the State Department "past
precedent" argument in explaining its holding. Comment-
ing on the precedent issue, the court merely remarked:
Plaintiffs and defendants here have
offered competing interpretations of
how the long sequence of treaty ter-
minations in our history was accomplished.
Whether or not the historical record
supports either party's substantive
constitutional argument -- and we express
no views on this -- it does show that
when Congress wants to participate
directly in the termination rocess, it
can find the means to do so.
ll 0
In direct contrast to the majority, Judge MacKinnon
in dissent spoke most pointedly to the teachings of his-
tory. Seizing upon the historical analysis presented in
109. 481 F. Supp. 949, 960 (D.D.C. 1979).
110. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Wright, J. concurring) (emphasis supplied).
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this article, he concluded after some fourteen pages of
discussion that the State Department's arguments on this
subject were vacuous and that in each of the instances
discussed in the Hansell Memorandum, the President had
not acted alone in terminating the treaties in question.
On appeal, then, the "past precedent" issue once
again worked only in favor of the Goldwater challenge:
State Department arguments on the subject went almost
completely unheeded.
On December 13, 1979, the Supreme Court vacated the
Court of Appeals opinion and remanded the case to the
District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint.
In so ordering, the Court gave no majority opinion on
any of the numerous substantive questions (including
past precedent) posed by the litigants. Thus, the basic
constitutional issue at stake -- whether the President
may independently terminate treaties on his own initia-
tive -- remains a matter for conjecture.
Should a future President try to follow Mr. Carter's
example by abrogating a treaty without first consulting
the Senate or Congress as a whole, he will most certainly
face charges identical to those leveled in Goldwater v.
Carter. In that instance, it seems clear from this dis-
cussion that that President will be able to call upon
only one historical example in his defense -- President
Carter's unilateral termination of the 1954 Mutual
Defense Treaty with Taiwan.

